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COURT ORDERED PSYCHIATRIC
EXAMINATION OF A RAPE VICTIM IN A
CRIMINAL RAPE PROSECUTION-OR HOW
MANY TIMES MUST A WOMAN BE RAPED?
Roberta J. O'Neale*
"[Rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho
never so innocent. "'
"No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury
unless the female complainant's social history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified
physician. "2
INTRODUCTION
Almost all the special rules surrounding the law of sexual
assault and related sex crimes are based on these two famous
quotes, or perhaps more aptly "old saws." 3 These quotes, by
Lord Hale and Dean Wigmore respectively, are the legal reflec-
tion of the underlying societal attitudes toward women in gen-
eral, and rape victims in particular. Similarly, they are the
cornerstone of the present day law permitting court ordered
psychiatric examinations of rape victims and admission into
evidence of testimony concerning such examinations.
Initially, this article provides an overview of the present
law governing the use of psychiatric evidence in rape cases,
focusing on California's experience. After developing this over-
view, the article demonstrates that the court ordered psychiat-
ric examination is merely one of a host of special procedures
utilized by the legal system in sex offense cases. Then, the
article explores the key role traditional attitudes have played
in the formulation of the present law, and exposes the lack of
foundation for these attitudes given the current realities of rape
prosecution. Since these attitudes have little or no basis in
* B.S., 1965, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1977, Boalt Hall School of
Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (Philadelphia 1847).
2. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 737 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1970).
3. Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
919, 932 (1973).
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reality, the article concludes that the use of psychiatric exami-
nations based on such assumptions should be severely re-
stricted, if not abandoned.
PRESENT LAW GOVERNING THE USE OF PSYCHIATRIC
EXAMINATIONS-AN OVERVIEW
The view that complainants in sex offense cases should be
examined psychiatrically to determine their credibility is
widely held, and is usually considered progressive because of
its use of modern science (i.e., psychiatry). The progressive
aspects of using such evidence are dimmed somewhat when one
considers that in 1937-38 the American Bar Association Com-
mittee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence recom-
mended that the complaining witness in all charges of sex of-
fenses be subject to a mandatory psychiatric examination prior
to trial so as to ascertain "her" probable credibility and that
the report thus generated be admissible evidence.' The report
asserted that
Today it is unanimously held (and we say "unanimously"
advisedly) by experienced psychiatrists that the complain-
ant woman in a sex offense should always be examined by
competent experts to ascertain whether she suffers from
some mental or moral delusion or tendency, frequently
found especially in young girls, causing distortion of the
imagination in sex cases. . . .The warnings of the psychi-
atric profession, supported as they are by thousands of
observed cases, should be heeded by our profession.'
Additionally, many of the old standby tomes concerning
the laws of evidence support the American Bar Association's
view, Wigmore's in particular.' Wigmore felt that the rules of
evidence should be changed when the witness was a female sex-
charge complainant:
But the lamentable thing is that the orthodox rules of evi-
dence in most instances prevent adequate probing of the
testimonial mentality of a woman witness, so as to reveal
the possible falsity of such charges . . . . [O]nly an in-
4. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 924a, at 746-47.
5. Id. at 747 (emphasis in original).
6. Wigmore cites the A.B.A. recommendation extensively, but neglects to men-
tion that he was the chairman of the five man committee which drafted the recommen-
dation and presented it to the advisory members of the committee at large. 63 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 588. The A.B.A. recommendation itself cites back to Wigmore's comments
on the subject. Id.
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quiry into the social and mental history will reveal the
degree of credibility. This inquiry the law of evidence
ought to permit to the fullest extent, rejecting the hin-
drance of rules that were framed without an understanding
of these facts
The text of Wigmore's remarks has varied little, if at all,
since its original introduction into Evidence in the 1934 sup-
plement to the second edition, up to the present Chadbourne
revised edition of 1970. Similarly, McCormick continues to
favor such examinations:
In one type of case, namely that of sex offenses, the indis-
pensible value of this kind of testimony has been urged by
Wigmore, and other commentators. . . .The special dan-
ger of sympathy swaying the judgment, on credibility in sex
cases points to the need for making possible expert opinion
concerning the credibility of the prosecuting witness in
such cases.'
Apart from the textwriters, many legal commentators have
also spoken in favor of using psychiatric testimony in cases
involving sex offenses.' These articles seem to share a simulta-
neous distrust of women as rape victim-witnesses and a great
deal of confidence in the powers of psychiatry. It is only in the
most recent commentaries, usually with a feminist perspective,
that the use of such psychiatric examinations are disap-
proved."° A few other commentators advocate not using such
examinations, not because of belief of, or sympathy for, victims
of sexual assaults, but because they doubt psychiatrists' ability
to evaluate credibility."
7. Id. at 736-37.
8. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 45, at 95-96 (2d ed. 1972).
9. See, e.g., Conrad, Psychiatric Lie Detection-The Federal Court's Break With
Tradition, 21 F.R.D. 199 (1957); Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's
Analysis of Corroboration, Consent and Character, 11 AM. CraM. L. REv. 309 (1973);
Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach,
48 CALIF. L. Rav. 648 (1960); Saxe, Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the Credibility of
Witnesses, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 238 (1970); Tuchler, Credibility of a Witness, 8 J. Soc.
Sci. 325 (1963); Comment, Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examination as Proposed Means for
Testing the Complainant's Competency to Allege a Sex Offense, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 651;
26 IND. L.J. 98 (1950); 43 IOWA L. REV. 650 (1958); 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 505 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Wood, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11
AM. CraM. L. REv. 335 (1973); Comment, supra note 3; Note, The Rape Corroboration
Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Slovenko, Witnesses, Psychiatry and the Credibility of Testimony,
19 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1966); Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1137 (1967).
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In contrast to the many commentaries, there is a lack of
case law discussing the propriety of admitting psychiatric testi-
mony on the issue of the victim-witnesses' credibility. Fortun-
ately, no court has adopted the extreme view propounded byWigmore and the ABA; that all sex offense victims should be
forced to undergo mandatory psychiatric examinations. One
case came close to adopting such a rule by holding that the
uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix was insufficient to
sustain a conviction of a sex crime, unless she had been exam-
ined by a psychiatrist to test her credibility. 2 However, this
case was subsequently overruled. 3 Nevertheless, the fact that
no courts have taken this position may not be because they
disagree with such a procedure and the ideas behind it. Courts
that have discussed the matter have observed that a blanket
rule requiring all complaining witnesses in sex crimes to un-
dergo a psychiatric examination to determine their credibility
should come from the legislature."4 Though this absolute posi-
tion has not been adopted, many jurisdictions permit the intro-
duction of psychiatric testimony as to the credibility of a wit-
ness in criminal sex cases. 5 Furthermore, the exclusion of such
psychiatric evidence in the context of these cases may consti-
tute reversible error."
In addition to permitting the introduction of psychiatric
evidence, most courts have held that trial judges have the dis-
cretion to order the complaining witness in a sex crime to un-
dergo psychiatric examination. 7 The real meaning of the terms
"compel," "order," and "mandatory" are rarely explained and
this has generated a great deal of confusion. That is, most
courts do not say what the consequences of a victim refusing
such an order would be. Certainly the victim could not be
physically forced to undergo psychiatric examination. How-
ever, she is not really free to choose whether or not to submit
to such an order, either. It seems that the alternatives are to
acquiesce or be subject to some sort of sanctions of greater or
lesser degree. If this were not the case it would be rather silly
for the court to "order" an examination. The question of what
12. Burton v. State, 232 Ind. 246, 111 N.E.2d 892 (1953).
13. Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957).
14. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433, 1437 (1967).
15. Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 174 n.9, 410 P.2d 838, 848 n.9, 49Cal. Rptr. 302, 312 n.9 (1966) (crime in tape, victim/witness is female, adult).
16. Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 715, 470 P.2d 345, 349, 87 Cal. Rptr.
361, 365 (1970) (murder, teenage female witness).
17. See Annot., supra note 14, § 4, at 1433, and cases compiled therein.
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the sanction is to be is left unanswered by most courts, perhaps
because the answer is obvious-the victim would be in con-
tempt and the court would apply the usual punishments, or the
charges against the defendant would be dismissed. Other alter-
natives considered by the courts are making the examination
a condition for allowing the victim to testify'8 or commenting
to the jury on the victim's refusal to submit. 9 Thus the victim
is in a typical double-bind type situation, or more classi-
cally-"heads, I win; tails, you lose."
California Law Governing the Admissibility of Psychiatric
Examinations
California sanctioned court ordered psychiatric examina-
tions in sex violation cases in Ballard v. Superior Court,2 ° a
unanimous decision authored by Justice Tobriner. An under-
standing of Ballard and its sequel, People v. Russell,"' is critical
since these cases are widely cited by other state courts, articles,
and treatises as some of the prime judicial underpinnings al-
lowing court ordered examinations.
In Ballard, the court held that in sex offense cases psychi-
atric evidence was admissible to impeach the complaining wit-
ness and that the trial judge at his discretion could order the
prosecutrix to undergo a psychiatric examination on the ques-
tion of her credibility. In doing so, the court stated: "[I1n
rejecting the polar extremes of an absolute prohibition and an
absolute requirement that the prosecutrix submit to a psychi-
atric examination, we have accepted a middle ground, placing
the matter in the discretion of the trial judge."22
In outlining this vast "middle ground" of judicial discre-
tion the court supplied few guidelines and raised a number of
questions. Initially, Ballard provided that the trial judge could
order the examination if the defendant presented a
"compelling reason" for it, 3 or alternatively, "if the circum-
stances indicate a necessity for an examination."2 This
"'necessity" was said to arise when "little or no corroboration
18. State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967).
19. 64 Cal. 2d at 177, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
20. Id.
21. 69 Cal. 2d 187, 443 P.2d 794, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864
(1968) (incest, 15 year old female victim/witness).
22. 64 Cal. 2d at 177, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
23. Id. at 176, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
24. Id. at 176-77, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
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support[s] the charge and if the defense raise[s] the issue of
the effect of the complaining witness' mental or emotional con-
dition upon her veracity."" However, these "guidelines" sup-
ply little guidance for a trial judge who is petitioned to order a
psychiatric examination. They simply provoke more questions
such as what level of corroboration does not support the
charges, or what circumstances "indicate a necessity."
Ballard also raised the issue of when the results are admis-
sible at trial, once an examination has been ordered. The court
again supplied only a partial answer. It noted that the admissi-
bility of such evidence "depend[ed] upon its posture in the
whole picture presented to the trial court" and that if there
were compelling reasons for admission the court would abuse
its discretion in rejecting it.2"
As to some questions, Ballard offered no answers at all:
who chooses the psychiatrist (i.e., the prosecution, the court,
or the defendant)? must the judge order an examination sua
sponte if the conditions warrant? should the victim be in-
formed that she may refuse to undergo the examination and
what the consequences of such an action would be?
Perhaps noting the problems generated by Ballard, the
California Supreme Court spoke again on the issue of court
ordered psychiatric examinations in People v. Russell. 27 Russell
examined and clarified much of the Ballard analysis. For ex-
ample, in discussing the judge's determination as to whether
to order a psychiatric examination, the court declared: "This
decision must rest for the most part on the court's judgment
as to whether an emotional or mental condition is involved
which a body of laymen either would be unable to detect or
would be unable to relate in terms of effect to the matter of
credibility."28
The court then discussed in some detail what factors the
trial court should use to guide it in deciding whether to admit
the psychiatric evidence generated by the examination. As
summed up by the court, these factors were: the relevance of
the evidence on the issue of credibility, the probability of effec-
tive communication of the substance of the expert opinion to
the jury, the adequacy of the examination to provide the basis
25. Id. at 177, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
26. Id. at 175, 410 P.2d at 848, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
27. 69 Cal. 2d 187, 443 P.2d 794, 20 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1968).
28. Id. at 195, 443 P.2d at 800, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
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of a reliable opinion, and the tendency of the evidence to decide
rather than inform.
29
As can be seen, this opinion is considerably more helpful
than Ballard, at least in giving some guidelines within which
the trial judge may exercise his/her discretion. However, it is
still unclear as to just what sort of initial showing the defense
must make regarding the victim's "emotional or mental condi-
tion." Similarly, the court failed to reach the question of who
appoints/chooses the psychiatrist, although in this case it was
clear from the facts that the psychiatrist was hired by the
defense and this was not questioned by the court. The court
also gave one final bit of advice: "[T/he legal discretion of the
judge should be exercised liberally in favor of the defendant. ""
In summary then, Russell favors court-ordered psychiatric ex-
aminations even more strongly than Ballard.
To date, Ballard and Russell are the sum total of the
California Supreme Court's direct pronouncements on court
ordered psychiatric examinations in criminal sex cases. How-
ever, in a child molesting case where the victims showed no
indication or history of mental illness, the court implied that
failure by defense counsel to obtain a psychiatric examination
of these victims was inadequate representation by trial counsel
and that "only the rarest of cases would excuse counsel from
obtaining one."'" This case would seem to support the view that
the court strongly favors the use of psychiatric examinations in
sex offense cases.
Generally, the appellate court cases have added little or
nothing to the California Supreme Court's standards as to
when an examination should be ordered and when the results
of that examination should be admitted. 2 However, People v.
29. Id. at 197, 443 P.2d at 802, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
30. Id. at 198, 443 P.2d at 802, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (emphasis added). Accord,
People v. Newton, 244 Cal. App. 2d 82, 88, 52 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966) (rape, adult female
victim/witness).
31. People v. Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 140 n.3, 520 P.2d 393, 397 n.3, 113 Cal. Rptr.
9, 13 n.3 (1974) (sexual assault of child, two 9 year old victim/witnesses).
32. See People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 3d 803, 132 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1976) (oral
copulation and lewd and lascivious act on a child, 12 and 13 year old female vic-
tim/witnesses, stepdaughters of defendant); People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102,
132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976) (murder, adult female witness); People v. Rocco, 21 Cal. App.
3d 96, 98 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1971) (rape, adult female victim/witness); People v. Davis,
20 Cal. App. 3d 890, 98 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1971) (incest and statutory rape, 12 and 13 year
old female victim/witness); People v. Hernandez, 18 Cal. App. 3d 651, 96 Cal. Rptr.
71 (1971) (rape, 18 year old female victim/witness); People v. Morales, 254 Cal. App.
3d 194, 61 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1967) (oral copulation and lewd and lascivious acts on a
child, somewhat retarded 13 year old victim/witness).
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Blakesley33 did add a new twist to the Ballard-Russell analysis.
In this case, the victim had already been examined by a psychi-
atrist pursuant to a Ballard-based court order. During the trial,
the defense attacked the victim's credibility generally and his
mental health specifically, but defendant did not call the psy-
chiatrist who examined the victim. The prosecution was then
allowed by the trial court to call the psychiatrist in rebuttal,
in an effort to rehabilitate the victim's credibility and to ex-
plain the effect of his mental state. In upholding the trial court,
the appellate court declared that Russell was just as applicable
to rehabilitation of a witness as to impeachment and that call-
ing the doctor who has examined the victim of a sex crime is a
two-way street. 4
Significantly, none of the appellate opinions,35 including
Blakesley, seem to question the basic "wisdom" of the Ballard-
Russell analysis nor do they put any meaningful restrictions on
the trial court's almost unfettered discretion to order psychiat-
ric examinations. These cases express no concern for the rights
or feelings of those compelled to undergo the examination and
the subsequent public examination of their psyche in the trial.
PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL LAW
GOVERNING CRIMINAL SEX CASES
The compelled psychiatric examination of victims in crim-
inal sex cases cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be exam-
ined as an outgrowth of a whole complex of laws fashioned
especially for rape and related sexual offense cases. Rape is a
very special crime-it is the only crime (with minor, often
archaic, exceptions, e.g., false promise of marriage) that by law
the victim is female and the perpetrator is male. 3 This injects
a sexual bias into the basic definition of the crime. Addition-
ally, the law of rape has essentially been created, interpreted
and enforced by men. 37 A rape trial most often pits the word of
33. 26 Cal. App. 3d 723, 102 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1972) (contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor (consenting homosexuality), minor male victim/witness).
34. Id. at 728-29, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 887-88.
35. See cases cited note 32 supra.
36. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1976).
37. According to one article, "[a] male-dominated society, with almost all posi-
tions of power and influence (in legislatures, administration of law, and the schools of
behavioral, medical and social science) occupied by men, tends to establish and per-
petuate the woman as a legitimate object for victimization. . . . Rape is behavior that
rarely receives legal attention and criminal sanction." Weis & Borges, Victimology and
Rape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim, 8 IssuEs IN CRIMINOLOGY 71, 107 (1973).
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a woman against that of a man, and because of what appears
to be a basic distrust of women in such a situation, the law has
developed many special laws, rules, and requirements to pro-
tect the male defendant. 8 Because of the persistent pressure of
women's groups, greatly increased publicity, and a rising level
of public consciousness, the rape related laws of California (and
some other states) are very much in flux. 9 However, these rules
still provide a great deal of insight into the attitudes which
spawned court ordered psychiatric examinations.
Corroboration Requirement
One of these special rules is the so-called "corroboration
requirement." This rule provides that the defendant in a rape
case may not be convicted if there is no evidence to corroborate
the victim's testimony. It is sometimes statutory and some-
times judge-made law, and is followed in only a minority of
American jurisdictions." In these jurisdictions the victim's tes-
timony must be supplemented by other witnesses or circum-
stantial evidence to sustain a conviction." California aligns
with the majority and does not require corroboration by law.'
Arguably, in practice, the chances of a totally uncorroborated
rape charge a) making it to trial, and b) resulting in a convic-
tion are low.4"
Resistance Requirement
A second rape related rule is the resistance requirement
which dictates that there must be some showing that the vic-
tim resisted the attacker in order to sustain the charge of rape."
The intended purpose of this requirement is to show the rap-
38. As one commentator, in discussing the Model Penal Code's rape provisions,
noted: "[Tihe predominant interest seems to be protecting men from false com-
plaints, not protecting females from being sexually assaulted or convicting those who
are guilty of sexual assault." Bienen, Rape I, WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP., December
1976, at 45, 54. It should be noted that a detailed historical analysis of Wigmore's
§ 924a and the sources quoted therein is in progress by the same author.
39. See Bienen, Rape II, "Chart of Current State Laws," WOMEN'S RIGHTs L.
REP., Spring/Summer 1977, at 90, 94-135. Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the
Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REV. 1500 (1975).
40. See Note, supra note 10, at 1367.
41. Id.
42. See People v. Gidney, 10 Cal. 2d 138, 73 P.2d 1186 (1937); People v. Mere-
dith, 266 Cal. App. 2d 467, 72 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1968).
43. See N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA
150 (1976).
44. People v. Peckham, 232 Cal. App. 2d 163, 167, 42 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1965).
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ist's intent to use force and the victim's nonconsent to the act.
California no longer requires the victim to resist to her utmost,
the law now says that the woman may determine the extent to
which she may safely resist." However, the court (or the jury)
still decides in the cold clear light of day if her decision was
reasonable."6
The resistance requirement supplies a clear illustration of
how the law of rape focuses on the victim and what she does,
almost to the exclusion of what the defendant does." In part,
the unfairness of such a rule is emphasized by a comment in
the Model Penal Code, supporting the view that a woman's fear
caused by a threat of violence need not be reasonably
grounded: "One who takes advantage of a woman's unreasona-
ble fears of violence should not escape punishment any more
than the swindler who cheats gullible people by false state-
ments which they should have found incredible."4 Further-
more this requirement should clearly be reconsidered in the
light of statistics which show quite emphatically that the rape
victim who resists is much more likely to be injured. 9
Impeachment Rules
Generally speaking, the courts have established much
more liberal rules of impeachment in sex offense cases." One
court states that "broad cross-examination of the prosecuting
witness on prior sexual experience, fabrication, and sexual
45. Id., 42 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
46. Id. at 168, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 675; People v. Merrill, 104 Cal. App. 2d 257, 262,
231 P.2d 573, 577 (1951); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIM. (CALJIC) No. 10.01
(3d rev. ed. 1970).
47. See generally Note, supra note 39, at 1504, 1508, 1516. Or, as one trial judge
said to a jury who had just acquitted an accused rapist: "[I]nstead of trying the
defendant, you make the poor girl the defendant. . . . They [rape victims] are made
the defendant, and they walk out of this courtroom with one thought in their mind:
In our courts there is not justice for the victims of rape. And I can't say that I disagree
with them." Id. at 1500.
48. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment at 247 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
49. BATTELLE LAW AND JUSTICE STUDY CENTER, FORCIBLE RAPE-A NATIONAL
SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE BY POLICE 61-62 (1975) [hereinafter cited as RESPONSE BY
POLICE]; see note 149 infra. See also Reisner, Factors Influencing the Decision of the
Rape Victim to Participate in the Process of Law Enforcement 15 (April 14, 1975)
(unpublished B.A. thesis in Princeton University Library); BATTELLE LAW AND JUSTICE
STUDY CENTER, FORCIBLE RAPE-A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE BY PROSECUTORS
38-39 (1975) [hereinafter cited as RESPONSE BY PROSECUTORS]; Note, supra note 39, at
1506; Weis & Borges, supra note 37, at 84, 93.
50. People v. Blagg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 598, 608, 73 Cal. Rptr. 93, 100 (1968);
People v. Neely, 228 Cal. App. 2d 16, 20, 39 Cal. Rptr. 251, 253 (1964).
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fantasy should be allowed."'" It is this special liberality that
underlies Ballard" and that is in part responsible for one of the
major differences in the prosecution of sex crimes-the admis-
sibility at trial of the victim's past sexual history. Evidence of
the victim's prior reputation for, and acts of, "unchastity" is
admissible under two theories: 1) as impeachment evidence
because credibility is affected (in women) by sexual activity;
and 2) as substantive evidence tending to show consent to the
rape, because women who have consented to sexual intercourse
in the past are more likely to have consented to this particular
act.53 Only in the crime of rape, and related sex offenses, is such
evidence admissible under either theory, and this is the major-
ity rule.5"
In California, the law concerning past sexual history has
changed radically since 1974. Up until the enactment of the
Robbins Rape Evidence Law in August of 1974,15 California
courts admitted the victim's past sexual history as evidence
relevant both to consent56 and credibility.57 With the enactment
of this law, section 1103 of the California Evidence Code was
amended such that it now prohibits the admission of any evi-
dence of the victim's previous sexual conduct to show consent,
with the exception of previous conduct with the defendant.
Also, newly added California Evidence Code section 782 makes
it procedurally much more difficult for the defendant to bring
in the victim's past sexual history on the issue of credibility.
The defendant must first submit a written motion and offer of
proof as to the relevancy of such evidence. If the judge finds
this sufficient, a hearing with the victim is then held out of the
presence of the jury. If the judge then finds the evidence rele-
vant and not inadmissible for other reasons, he or she will then
51. People v. Blagg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 598, 608-09, 73 Cal. Rptr. 93, 100 (1968)
(emphasis added).
52. See Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 173, 410 P.2d 838, 847, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 311 (1966).
53. See Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law, 11
WILLIAMETTE L.J. 36, 40-42 (1974).
54. Id.
55. CAL.'EvID. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (West 1976).
56. People v. Shea, 125 Cal. 151, 152, 57 P. 885, 885 (1899); People v. Byers, 10
Cal. App. 3d 410, 414, 88 Cal. Rptr. 886, 888 (1970); People v. Walker, 150 Cal. App.
2d 594, 601, 310 P.2d 110, 115 (1957); People v. Merrill, 104 Cal. App. 2d 257, 264-65,
231 P.2d 573, 577 (1951).
57. People v. Francis, 5 Cal. App. 3d 414, 416-17, 85 Cal. Rptr. 61, 62-63 (1970);
People v. Bumbaugh, 48 Cal. App. 2d 791, 798, 120 P.2d 703, 707 (1941). Cf. People v.
Rocco, 21 Cal. App. 3d 96, 107, 98 Cal. Rptr. 365, 372 (1971) (error to exclude evidence
of complaining witness' personality traits because it bears on witness' credibility).
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allow the evidence in, specifying in a court order the particular
evidence to be admitted and the nature of the questions to be
asked.
According to one of the drafters of the bill, its purpose was
to make this kind of evidence very difficult, if not impossible,
to get in, and so far it appears to be working just that way. 8
These changes of the evidence law have already been upheld
as constitutional by at least one appellate court. 9
Jury Instructions
In California, the evidence of past sexual history, was also
incorporated in a special jury instruction concerning chastity
that was given only in rape cases." This instruction provided
that the jury could infer that a woman who had consented to
intercourse previously would be more likely to consent again
and that evidence of her unchaste character goes to both her
consent and her credibility. This was changed by the addition,
in 1974, to the California Penal Code of section 1127(d) and (e),
which forbad the use of such an instruction and the use of the
term "unchaste character" in any jury instruction. This was
part of the same bill package as the amendments to the evi-
dence code.
The above jury instruction was not the only special rape
instruction in California. This famous quote from Lord Hale
(who was also well know for his firm belief in witches and his
support of their prosecution),0 ' was embalmed in California's
version of the very common "cautionary" instruction:
A charge such as that made against the defendant in
this case is one which is easily made, and once made, diffi-
cult to defend against, even if the person accused is inno-
cent.
Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testi-
mony of the female person named in the information with
caution 2
This instruction was mandatory sua sponte in all sex offense
58. See Hearings on S.B. 574 and S.B. 575 Before the Subcomm. on Violent
Crime of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 62-63 (1975) (statement of Camille Le-
Grande) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
59. People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 688-91, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864, 865-67
(1976).
60. CALJIC No. 10.06 (3d rev. ed. 1970).
61. C. EWEN, WrrCHCRAPr AND DEMONIANISM 128, 352 (1933).
62. CALJIC No. 10.22 (3d rev. ed. 1970).
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cases, and sex offense cases only, although the absence of the
instruction did not necessarily give rise to a prejudicial error.,
The underlying rationale of this instruction was that sex
crimes most frequently occur in private and thus the only evi-
dence was the victim's testimony. 4 However, in 1975, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court disavowed this rationale and held that
this instruction "is inappropriate in any context, and the fur-
ther use of such language is hereby disapproved." 5 The court
observed that the instruction had outworn its usefulness and
had no place in a contemporary California courtroom. This
view was echoed by the trial judge in this case, who found that
the instruction arbitrarily discriminated against women and
characterized all rape victims as spiteful, vengeful, vindictive
and base. 7 It has been replaced with a very mild cautionary
instruction to be used across the board in any criminal case
which does not require corroboration. 6
Despite the recent trend of California and other legal sys-
tems toward a body of law less discriminatory towards rape
victims, the underlying attitudes which gave rise to the original
rape-related rules still have an impact on court decisions. For
example, the California Supreme Court shortly after handing
down their decision on the cautionary instruction,69 handed
down People v. Mayberry.70 The rule of this case was that even
if forcible intercourse without consent was proven, the defen-
dant was not guilty of rape if he reasonably and in good faith
believed the victim consented. (It should also be noted that the
court held that this principle should also apply to kidnap-
ping).7 Because a mistake of fact instruction to this effect was
not given, the conviction was overturned, despite the court's
concession that the jury believed the victim's account. There
is now a new jury instruction to this effect.7"
63. See People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 394, 426 P.2d 161, 164, 58 Cal. Rptr.
1, 4 (1967); People v. Nye, 38 Cal. 2d 34, 40, 237 P.2d 1, 4 (1951); People v. Hernandez,
18 Cal. App. 3d 651, 659-60, 96 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1971).
64. People v. Nye, 38 Cal. 2d 34, 40, 237 P.2d 1, 4 (1951); People v. Hernandez,
18 Cal. App. 3d 651, 659, 96 Cal. Rptr. 71, 75-76 (1971).
65. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 882, 538 P.2d 247, 260, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 132 (1975).
66. Id. at 877, 883, 538 P.2d at 256, 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128, 132.
67. 1975 Hearings, supra note 58, at 23 (remarks of Judge Armand Arabian).
68. CALJIC No. 2.27 (3d rev. ed. 1970).
69. See notes 61-68 and accompanying text supra.
70. 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975).
71. Id. at 156-57, 542 P.2d at 1346, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
72. CALJIC No. 10.23 (3d rev. ed. 1976).
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Probably the most distressing aspect of this decision is the
factual situation in which the court applied its rule. The victim
was approached on the street by a complete stranger, refused
his threatening request for sex and his demand that she go with
him, and then was threatened, struck, and knocked down. Out
of fear and a hope for escape, she played along with him and
"put on an act."" Then after further threats and despite her
repeated attempts to talk him out of it, he led her to his apart-
ment, barricaded her in, struck her, and sexually assaulted her.
She did not resist out of fear and did not run because of an
arthritic leg. The man's brother arrived and also beat and at-
tempted to rape her. She finally escaped and immediately re-
ported the incident to the police. Several witnesses testified
that she was badly bruised and swollen in many places.
The implications this case holds for rape victims are
frightening. What must a victim do to convince a rapist that
she is not consenting to his assault? Must she choose between
risking serious injury or losing her life and being unable to
convict the rapist? Does the rapist have no responsibility for his
acts? This victim did what many victims do-tried to talk her
way out to avoid injury and/or rape. This is exactly what the
police and women's self-protection information tells her to do
if she is unskilled in fighting.74 It also could be argued that
Mayberry sanctions the admission of the victim's past sexual
history, as known to the rapist, on the theory that if he knew
she was "promiscuous," he could reasonably believe that she
consented to intercourse.75 This would circumvent both the let-
ter and the intent of the new rape evidence laws.7"
These rape-related rules when coupled with the Ballard-
Russell psychiatric examination procedure present the struc-
ture of rape law as it stands today. This body of law has both
positive and negative aspects; Ballard-Russell is one of the
negatives. But the whole body of law surrounding sex offenses
both positive and negative, springs from many of the same
basic societal attitudes and myths."
73. 15 Cal. 3d at 148, 542 P.2d at 1341, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
74. BAY AREA WOMEN AGAINST RAPE, INFORMATION PACKET (1975) [hereinafter
cited as BAWAR PACKET].
75. See Bienen, Mistakes, 7 PHILOSOPHY & PuB. AFF., (to be published); BAY AREA
WOMEN AGAINST RAPE, LEGAL INFORMATION FOR RAPE VICTIMS AND ADVOCATES 20 (1977).
76. See notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
77. The judiciary has been notably conservative, even as compared with societal
attitudes in general. See Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of
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RATIONALE UNDERLYING BALLARD AND OTHER SPECIAL RAPE RULES
Those in favor of psychiatric examinations for rape victims
and other special rules to protect the defendant in a sexual
offense case give a number of specific reasons that they feel
show the need for and justify such measures.
Beginning with Hale, there is one refrain that is heard over
and over again-rape is easy to charge. All the woman has to
do is say it happened.7" Concomitantly it is almost as fre-
quently held that there are many false charges of rape and
many innocent men have gone to jail because of this.7" Wigmore
echoes these sentiments: "Judging merely from the reports of
cases in the appellate courts, one must infer that many inno-
cent men have gone to prison because of tales whose falsity
could not be exposed."" Curiously he cites none of these cases,
nor any other authority for this proposition. Significantly,
these views are not confined to Wigmore and Hale. Another
commentator states that: "False accusations of sex crimes in
general, and rape in particular, are generally believed to be
much more frequent than untrue charges of other crimes."'
'8
This author also cites no authority for this statement, and de-
spite this, frequently repeats how common false accusations of
rape are.82 Along similar lines, another commentator notes
that: "It often happens in a case of conviction of a sex crime
that the prosecuting witness withdraws her accusation." 3 His
total authority for this position is one case.
The supposed danger of all those "false" accusations grows
out of two basic premises: first, that rape charges are very
difficult to disprove, and second, that the jury will be misled
by its emotions into convicting innocent men. 4 These false
accusations are imagined difficult to disprove because the
claimed nature of the crime is one in which eyewitnesses are
rarely present and reliable evidence is often lacking.1 The
fear is that the defendant will have no way to establish consent
Senate Bill 1678, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 1551, 1569 (1975).
78. See Bornstein, Investigation of Rape: Medicolegal Problems, 9 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 229, 235 (1963); Hibey, supra note 9, at 309.
79. Comment, supra note 53, at 49.
80. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 924a, at 736.
81. Note, supra note 11, at 1138.
82. Id. at 1138-39.
83. 43 IOWA L. REv. 650, 653 (1958).
84. Note, supra note 11, at 1139.
85. Id.
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or lack of penetration, and the trial will be no more than two
conflicting stories told under oath."8
The great distrust of the jury arises because of the fear that
the "respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a
wronged female" would cause them not to question the credi-
bility of the victim. 7 Also, there is concern that the jury would
automatically be prejudiced against the defendant because of
the great outrage and repugnance that is felt towards the com-
mission of such an offense."8 Furthermore, many commentators
have said that besides being swayed by their emotions, the jury
will also be unable to perceive the victim's lack of veracity,
because on the surface her testimony is straightforward and
convincing; her underlying pathology cannot be perceived by
lay persons (non-psychiatrists) in the courtroom. 8
Generally speaking, two main rationales are used to ex-
plain this supposed high incidence of false rape charges: first,
many women making sex charges simply lie for their own per-
sonal reasons, and second, many women making sex charges
are mentally ill. The belief that women lie for vindictive and
personal reasons is widespread, within the legal profession and
without. 0 A multitude of reasons are advanced for these sup-
posed lies: she is ashamed and guilty because of consenting to
intercourse, she is pregnant, she hates the man she accuses,
wishful thinking, injured pride, a childish desire for notoriety,
revenge, blackmail, she didn't get paid, etc. ad nauseum.1'
The view is also widespread that "this type of litigation is
especially likely to involve pathological witnesses, the prose-
cuting witness in particular. '9 2 What is especially interesting
is the multiplicity of psychopathologies peculiar to women,
that are said to underly the many false charges women make.
Wigmore's beliefs about female psychopathology are cited over
and over again to the point where it seems that if Wigmore says
it, it must be true. According to Wigmore, one dangerous form
of female mental abnormality, well known to psychiatrists,
86. Id.; Note, supra note 10, at 1382.
87. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 924a, at 736.
88. Note, supra note 11, at 1139; 26 IND. L.J. 98, 100 (1950).
89. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 924a, at 736; Comment, supra note 9, at 651;
Saxe, supra note 9, at 238; 26 IND. L.J. 98, 101-02 (1950).
90. OeIsner, Law of Rape: 'Because Ladies Lie,' N.Y. Times, May 14, 1972, § E,
at 5, col. 5.
91. See, e.g., Juviler, supra note 9, at 674; Oelsner, supra note 90; Note, supra
note 11, at 1138; Note, supra note 10, at 1373; 26 IND. L.J. 98, 103 (1950).
92. Juviler, supra note 9, at 674.
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"consists in a disposition to fabricate irresponsibly charges of
sex offenses against persons totally innocent."93 It is considered
dangerous because it does not affect other "mental opera-
tions."94 Wigmore seems to feel that there are a number of
females of excessive or perverted sexuality who lie plausibly
about sex charges: 5 "The unchaste . . . mentality finds inci-
dental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex
incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or victim."" In
support of this point Wigmore cites Dr. Karl Menninger, who
is of the opinion that almost all women fantasize rape and
many neurotic women translate their fantasies into belief.97
Wigmore's beliefs are based on five case studies (all involv-
ing young women aged seven through nineteen) cited in an
obscure 1915 textbook and on letters and monographs com-
posed by psychiatrists, the most recent dated 1933. Dr. Men-
ninger cited only one case in support of his views. The dated-
ness and societal bias of his comments are exemplified by his
characterization of this woman, unmarried and in her late
twenties, as a "spinster.""
Again, legal commentators have followed Wigmore's lead.
Dr. W. Overholser, a noted psychiatrist and the author of the
Issac Ray Award book, The Psychiatrist and the Law, also says
that many rape charges are based on personality disturbances,
but for authority for his attitudes he merely cites back to Wig-
more and his sources.9 Alternately, another author suggests
that psychiatrists agree these "false charges" of sex offenses
often result from an abnormal mental condition called
"pseudologia phantastica"'100 where "[t]he witness is usually
plausible and convincing, often because she believes her state-
ments to be true. She has not, however, lost contact with real-
ity."101
An additional rationale offered to explain why women
make "false" rape charges does not conclude that she lied in
93. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 934a, at 767.
94. See id.
95. See id. § 924a, at 737.
96. Id. at 736.
97. Id. at 744.
98. Id.
99. W. OVERHOUSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 51-54 (1953). Overholser
does give three examples of false accusations, but none are psychopathologically
caused; all are young girls, two are caused in part by police pressure on the girls.
100. 43 IOWA L. REv. 650, 651 (1958).
101. Id. at 651 n.7 (emphasis added).
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making the charge precisely, but that she unconsciously set up
the situation and is guilty of an unconscious complicity. This
is Slovenko's theory of the "riddance mechanism."' ' Under
this theory women are under such constant fear and anxiety
that they will be raped that some women allow themselves to
be raped in order "to get it over with" and rid themselves of
their anxiety.' °3 Because of contributory behavior and/or lack
of resistance in such a situation, this is not considered really a
"true" rape, and it is not felt that the offender deserves to be
punished so severely as a "true" rapist would be.' 4 (Slovenko
also notes: "Not unusually, the wish [for rape] may be very
near the fear.")'0 Slovenko offers little but anecdotal analogies
to back up his ideas; this seems little more than a reflection of
the male fantasy that all women want to be raped. As one
article notes, the many scientific books that stress an uncon-
cious "rape wish" make "no distinction between determined
seduction and violent rape."'0 6
A common thread underlying many of these rationales is
that all women fantasize rape. This premise leads the theorists
to the conclusion that all women want to be raped and as a
result they either believe they have been raped when they have
not or go out and get themselves raped. However, there is no
credible psychological evidence, nor any logical necessity, that
translates such fantasies into actual behavior and beliefs.' 7
Slovenko himself recognizes this when he discusses male fanta-
sies: "[Tihe fantasy of rape, which nearly every male has
entertained, is one thing, but the deed is quite another. It is a
big step when one goes from wish to deed, from a wish to rape
to that of an actual raping. Religious teaching is misdirected
when it fails to distinguish thought and deed and treats them
as equal.' 01 8
Similarly, some women do fantasize rape;' but where this
information leads many commentators is patently incorrect
102. R. Slovenko, A Panoramic View: Sexual Behavior and the Law, in SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 5, 52-53 (R. Slovenko ed. 1965).
103. Id.
104. Comment, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV.
680, 682-85 (1966).
105. Slovenko, supra note 102, at 127 n.49.
106. Weis & Borges, supra note 37, at 79.
107. Id. at 92.
108. Slovenko, supra note 102, at 49.
109. BAWAR PACKET, supra note 74 ("A Few Rape Myths"); see generally S.
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 322-33 (1975).
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and unsupported. A woman remains in control in a fantasy and
is unlikely to fantasize sexual intercourse with a mate who, in
addition to not being chosen or desired, inflicts her with pain."10
As noted by one author, who discussed sex fantasies with sev-
eral dozen women, there is a marked distinction between a
sexual fantasy and forcible rape:
Better than half described rape; but it was always in the
precise circumstances, and by the specific men, of their
choice. It was absolutely clear from the nature of the mate-
rial that these fantasies served no wish to be genuinely
raped, but a wish to feel guiltless-"I can't blame myself,
if he made me do it"-in a desired sexual encounter. Still,
the fantasy exists, and it feeds the myth."'
Additionally, there is an unfortunate tendency by many
writers, even those sympathetic to the women's point of view,
to equate fantasizing, especially of rape, with some form of
mental illness."2
Another common thread underlying many of the rationales
offered to explain why women make "false" rape charges, is a
level of male hostility towards women who charge rape. Though
this attitude is difficult to comprehend, it perhaps explains in
part the harshness of the special rape rules. It grew out of a
deep-seated fear and distrust of women and their sexuality,
which developed in nineteenth century America, and contin-
ued into this century."' It should be noted that this is the
society that shaped Wigmore's and his contemporaries' beliefs
about women and rape. This attitude is also mirrored in state-
110. Weis & Borges, supra note 37, at 92.
111. Lear, Q. If You Rape a Woman and Steal Her TV, What Can They Get You
For in New York? A. Stealing Her TV, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at
63, col. 1.
112. Note, supra note 10, at 1378.
113. See G.J. BARKER-BEFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNOWN Liw-MALZ
A-rrrUDEs TOWARD WOMEN AND SEXUALITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMEmCA (1976).
From the late nineteenth century, up into the 1930's and 1940's, sexual surgery
(clitoridectomy, female castration, hysterectomy, etc.) was still performed on women
(by male gynecologists) in order to cure psychological disorders (such as promiscuity,
masturbation) and was used as a tool to restore rebellious women to their standard
submissive role in society. See id. at 120-32. Woman's sexuality, and her sexual organs,
were perceived as dangerous to men and also believed to make women specially liable
to mental illness. Id. Another author has noted this connection between the laws about
and attitudes toward rape, and the nineteenth century morality: "[Tlhe case law [of
rape] . . . incorporates moral concepts prevalent at the time the law was being formu-
lated. The moral code of the nineteenth century strongly condemned sexual relations
outside of marriage. Women who had engaged in such relations were considered mor-
ally depraved .... " Note, supra note 77, at 1551; see also id. at 1569.
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ments by recent authors, as illustrated by one legal writer's
comments about rape complainants: "[N]othing should be
left to the conceivably unreasonable opinion of the alleged vic-
tim . . . . [The resistance standard] goes far toward removing
. . . the woman's often distorted opinion from the law of forci-
ble rape.""' Perhaps the extreme example of this attitude is
found in a letter from a Michigan attorney to the author of an
article on judicial attitudes towards rape victims:
I note your article in Judicature . . . . I also note with
great disapprobation and disgust the rancid, fetid and fe-
culent efforts of Women's Libbers and other facists to
change the burden of proof in rape cases to the defendant,
who usually had it in practice anyhow. While the prospect
of any such change in the law provokes me to vomit, I have
a counter proposal to make, which you may convey to the
Center for Rape Concern, whatever the hell that is: When
a female has induced the prosecutorial authority to insti-
tute a charge of rape against a man, and that man is ac-
quitted, without further delay the prosecutrix shall be car-
ried in a cart to the nearest public square and there disem-
bowelled alive, and then hanged by the feet and left to rot
in the sun."'
In summary then, the legal system has developed a set of
special rules and procedures, including psychiatric examina-
tions, to govern sex offense cases. The rules and procedures are
the outgrowth of a chain of reasoning that begins with the basic
premise that rape is easy to charge. This fact is then said to
produce many false charges of rape. These false accusations are
viewed as dangerous because the rape charge is difficult to
disprove and frequently results in convictions from juries car-
ried away by sympathy for the victim. Finally, two basic ra-
tionales are offered to explain why women would make false
charges in the first place: many women simply lie for personal
reasons or they are mentally ill. The question then becomes
does this chain of reasoning have any basis in reality?
REALITY-THE LAW IN PRACTICE
"I had some thought about this, actually maybe what we
need is an instruction that says, 'This particular charge is
brought with such difficulty and is so easily defended against
114. Comment, supra note 104, at 683-85.
115. N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, supra note 43, at 180.
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that you should regard the word of the defendant with cau-
tion.' ''I"6
The myths inherent in the above chain of reasoning are
best dispelled with current statistical data. According to the
FBI rape is the most frequently committed violent crime in
America as well as the most under reported."' Nobody really
knows just how many rapes do take place each year because of
the reluctance of the victim to report it. Estimates range from
only 1 in 20 reporting, to 1 in 4.5.I18
Since the major premise supporting the special treatment
accorded rape cases, including the psychiatric examination, is
that there are many false charges of rape, this particular prem-
ise must be dealt with in some depth. This is a difficult myth
to dispell, not because it is true, but because in a way it gives
rise to a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is because those who most
often make the decision as to whether the victim of rape is
lying, and who set up the criteria for making this decision, are
usually those who believe most strongly in the myth-male
police officers."'
The police decision that a rape report is false is expressed
by "unfounding" the complaint. According to the FBI this
means that after investigation the complaint has been found
to be "false or baseless."'' 0 Of the rapes that are reported to
the police, FBI records reveal a national average of 15% "un-
founded" charges.' 2' The extraordinary concern for the au-
116. 1975 Hearings, supra note 58, at 65. This sentiment was echoed in a study
of rape in San Francisco. In criticising the Lord Hale-based California cautionary
instruction, it stated: "This jury instruction is prejudicial and not based in fact: rape
is a chrage which is extremely difficult to bring and prosecution data shows that it is
easy to defend against." QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, RAPE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 46
(Final Rep. 1975) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as FINAL RAPE STUDY].
117. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 22, 24 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS]; Comment,
supra note 53, at 36. Rape also shows the greatest increase of offenses over the 5 year
period since 1970-48%. 1975 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra at 11.
118. Note, supra note 10, at 1374-75; Comment, supra note 3, at 921.
119. One commentator quotes police investigators as saying that "80% to 90%
of the rapes reported are not really rapes." Comment, Police Discretion and the Judg-
ment That a Crime Has Been Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
277, 279 n.8 (1968). A San Francisco patrolman is quoted as saying: "Most rape reports
are not worth the time they take to write." QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, RAPE VICTIMI-
ZATION STUDY 53 (Prelim. Rep. 1975) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY RAPE STUDY].
120. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK 43
(1974) [hereinafter cited as UCR HANDBOOK]. A strict and narrow definition of this
term is given: "If your investigation shows that no offense occurred nor was attempted,
the reported offense can be unfounded for UCR purposes." Id.
121. 1975 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 117, at 24.
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thenticity of rape reports is exemplified by the fact that up
until the most recent issue, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports
have never given the unfounding rate for any crime other than
rape."' FBI figures carry weight. This unfounding figure is
often pointed to as proof of the frequent occurrence of false
charges.1' However, as one commentator noted, rape charges
are unfounded for a variety of reasons, most of which have
nothing to do with the truth of the charge.' 4 Support for this
latter view is found in two different nationwide surveys of po-
lice departments which disclosed that "a wide variety of un-
founding procedures [are] employed . "2... "5 One of these
reports questioned the integrity of the unfounding decisions:
"Some police departments have used the 'unfounded' label to
reduce the rate of reported rapes with the stroke of a pen.
Others have used this category to reduce the number of open
cases. And still others have allowed this label to cover inappro-
priate, prejudicial judgments by their officers."'26 The other
study revealed that only eight percent of the police depart-
ments surveyed followed the strict FBI Uniform Reports
standards, and unfound on the basis of insufficient evidence
only. '2 Others unfound because of too much time between of-
fense and report (18%),128 lack of victim cooperation (36%), or
a combination of insufficient evidence and lack of cooperation
(38%).129 The Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook specifically
says that refusal of the victim to prosecute (i.e., an uncoopera-
tive victim) is not grounds for unfounding a complaint.' 3 It is
122. E.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 22 (1974). However, in the uniform crime reports released on August
25, 1976, the following figures on unfounding of offenses were given: overall, 4% of the
complaints reported to the police are unfounded; violent crimes, 8% unfounded; prop-
erty crimes, 4% unfounded; rape, 15% unfounded; larceny-theft, 3% unfounded. 1975
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 117, at 10.
123. E.g., Comment, supra note 119, at 279 n.8. This commentator, however,
believes the Federal Bureau of Investigation figures to be "misleadingly low." Id.
124. Comment, supra note 3, at 928-29.
125. RESPONSE BY POLICE, supra note 49, at 43; see also CENTER FOR WOMEN
POLICY STUDIES, RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS, HEALTH FACILITIES, AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as RAPE REPORT].
126. RAPE REPORT, supra note 125, at 49. The irrationality of some of these
unfounding judgments is illustrated by the Philadelphia Police Department which
unfounds most (56%) complaints where the victim refuses to undergo a medical exami-
nation, yet the medical information gained from such examinations is included in only
18% of the investigative reports. Comment, supra note 119, at 289, 311.
127. RESPONSE BY POLICE, supra note 49, at 44.
128. Yet rape victims do not always report immediately. See Bienen, supra note
38, at 53; Weis & Borges, supra note 37, at 102-03.
129. RESPONSE BY POLICE, supra note 49, at 44.
130. UCR HANDBOOK, supra note 120, at 13, 43.
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quite clear that the unfounding rate for rape is more a reflec-
tion of police officers' (and society's) prejudices than it is of
false reports by rape victims.'
Where sophisticated special units are set up to handle sex-
ual assault cases, using more sensitive, better trained investi-
gators, a more accurate picture of the false charges presented
to the police develops. The commander of the Rape Analysis
Squad in New York City reported an estimated unfounding
rate of 2%, no more than the rate for other crimes.'32 Futher-
more, what false charges there are just don't make it to trial.
"The few false reports are disposed of by police investigation
and questioning, the prosecutor's interview and polygraph test,
and the grand jury investigation. Prosecutors believe this
131. This can be exemplified by comparing the attitudes of the heads of two
California urban police department's sexual assault units with their department's
respective unfounding rates. Inspector P. Doran, former chief (1975-1977) of the Berke-
ley Police Department's sex crimes detail said that his department does not unfound
unless there is solid evidence that the rape did not occur, even though he might be
suspicious of some of the reports. He also stated that he felt that the amount of false
reports of rape was similar to that of other crimes, such as robbery. The department
unfounded less than 1% of its rape cases in 1975 (1 out of 105) and none of its rape
complaints in 1976 (115). Interview with Inspector Phillip E. Doran, Chief, Sex
Crimes Detail, Berkeley Police Department of Berkeley, Cal., in Berkeley, Cal.
(Feb. 21 & Mar. 7, 1977). On the other hand Sergeant W. Kivett, senior investigator
in Oakland's Police Department, stated that his Department had no consistent policy
concerning unfounding and that it depended on the individual investigator. He listed
factors that would be considered in unfounding: drinking by the victim, insufficient
evidence, lack of cooperation by the victim (i.e., victim does not recontact the unit,
does not answer the letter the unit sends her), and time between offense and report (if
excessive). Interview with Sgt. W. Kivett, senior investigator, Sexual Assaults Detail,
Oakland Police Department, in Oakland, Cal. (Feb. 23, 1977). The Oakland Police
Department's unfounding rate in 1976 was 23% (70 out of 310), and in 1975, 16% (48
out of 299). City of Oakland, Inter-Office Letter, Re: 1976 Annual Crime Summary
(Feb. 1, 1977).
132. Comment, supra note 53, at 49. The City of San Francisco, which has a
special Sex Crimes Prosecution Team in addition to its Sex Crimes Detail, has an
unfounding rate of about 4% (5 out of 119, for the first 4 months of 1975), FINAL RAPE
STUDY, supra note 116, at 27, a rate comparable to the F.B.I. rate for all crime com-
plaints. See, note 122 supra. Bay Area Women Against Rape, which as a well publi-
cized crisis line could expect to receive its fair share of calls from mentally disturbed
persons and cranks, found that about 4% of their calls reporting a sexual assault (in
1976, 11 out of 262) were questionable or suspicious. Of these 11, 6 were from women
and 5 were from men and/or men pretending to be women. Hands Off!, BAWAR
Newsletter, March, 1977, at 16 (data compiled by author of this article).
In view of the widely held distrust of child victims of sexual assault and the
tendency to dismiss their reports as fantasy, it is interesting to note that a psychiatric
study of children aged 2 to 12 years who reported sexual assaults to the Philadelphia
police showed a false report rate of just over 6%. Peters, Children Who Are Victims of
Sexual Assault and the Psychology of Offenders, 30 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 398, 414,
416 (1976).
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screening process insures that no fabricated cases get to trial.
Instead, many bona fide cases are dropped during the screening
process.'" 33
A second link in the previously mentioned chain of reason-
ing is the belief that a rape charge is difficult to defend against.
Whatever its relevance in Hale's time, this myth is totally in-
applicable today. The conviction rate for forcible rape is the
lowest of any violent crime; only one out of seven reported
rapes results in a conviction.'34 In California, there were 8,349
rapes reported to the police in 1973; 660 were convicted; of
those 660 convicted, only some 300 received any jail time, and
of those, only 145 went to state prison.'35 Of the FBI's four
"violent crimes," murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggra-
vated assault, forcible rape has the highest rate of acquittal. 3
Yet another reason illustrating that Hale's "old saw" is not
applicable today is the radically changed position of the crimi-
nal defendant since 17th century England. In People v. Rincon-
Pineda, the California Supreme Court discussed this fact at
length, contrasting the many rights the defendant now has that
he did not have then: The defendant is now competent to tes-
tify in his own behalf, the presumption of innocence, guilt
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, right to present witnesses
and compel their attendance, right to counsel, etc. 3' In light
of the foregoing advances the court concluded that "the spectre
of wrongful conviction, whether for rape or for any other crime,
has led our society to arm modern defendants with the potent
accouterments of due process which render the additional con-
straint of Hale's caution superfluous and capricious.' ' 38
As to that belief that juries are typically sympathetic to
rape victims, Los Angeles County Trials Division chief attorney
remarked: "Jurors are usually twelve hung-up people who
won't convict in a rape case if they can avoid it . . . .Legal
theory is not legal reality.' 39 The chief attorney is not alone in
his belief; it is strongly echoed by Kalven and Zeisel's exhaus-
tive empirical study of juries in America. The authors wrote:
133. Comment, supra note 53, at 49-50 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 37.
135. 1975 Hearings, supra note 58, at 41 (remarks of Sen. Robbins, Chairman).
136. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 879, 538 P.2d 247, 257, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 129 (1975).
137. Id. at 877-78, 538 P.2d at 260-61, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
138. Id. at 878, 538 P.2d at 261, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
139. N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, supra note 43, at 182.
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"The jury . . . does not limit itself to this one issue [consent
to intercourse]; it goes on to weigh the woman's conduct in the
prior history of the affair. It closely, and often harshly, scruti-
nizes the female complainant and is moved to be lenient with
the defendant whenever there are suggestions of contributory
behavior on her part.' 14
0
There are a number of reasons why juries demonstrate a
reluctance to sympathize with rape victims. First, there is a
widespread societal belief that the rape victim is often at
fault;' that she is responsible for her attack and not an inno-
cent victim.' As a result, juries do not perceive the behavior
of her attacker as "real" rape. Second, there is an equally wide-
spread societal myth that "nice" girls do not get raped.' The
impact of this myth extends beyond juries to others involved
in the judicial system. For example, in situations where there
was a prior victim-offender relationship and it is reasoned that
the victim was "asking for it," judges have described the situa-
tion as "felonious gallantry" and "assault with failure to
please."'4 One study found a number of defense attorneys who
felt that forced sexual intercourse "with a date, an acquain-
tance or an ex-boyfriend constituted a personal problem, cer-
tainly not a crime."' 45 Along similar lines, most prosecutors
nationwide feel that the victim's past sexual history in general
is a major factor in jury deliberation. 4  This proposition is
140. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249 (1966).
141. See RESPONSE BY POLICE, supra note 49, at 139; Reisner, supra note 49, at
49.
142. Weis & Borges, supra note 37, at 85.
143. Id.
144. See Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Towards Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303,
304-05 (1974).
The problem of judicial attitudes towards rape victims has been highlighted re-
cently in the national press. A prime example is the Wisconsin judge who said that
rape was a normal reaction to prevalent sexual permissiveness and women's provoca-
tive clothing. San Francisco Chronicle, May 27, 1977, at 1, col. 1. Further, a California
justice received considerable publicity for stating in an appellate court decision that
it is not unreasonable for a man to expect a lone woman hitchhiker in a metropolitan
area to consent to sexual advances. Id. July 23, 1977, at 2, col. 2. In light of the
Mayberry decision concerning "reasonable" mistake of fact, discussed supra, this is a
particularly alarming point of view-it would in effect license the rape of women
hitchhikers. However, much of the objectionable language in the opinion was later
deleted. See Los Angeles Times, Aug. 10, 1977, at 2, col. 1.
145. PRELIMINARY RAPE STUDY, supra note 119, at 61. Yet, it has been noted that
the psychiatric harm to the victim is usually greater when the rapist is an acquaint-
ance, rather than a stranger. Bienen, supra note 38, at 54; Weis & Borges, supra note
37, at 99-100.
146. RESPONSE BY PROSECUTORS, supra note 49, at 79.
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borne out by Kalven and Zeisel. They described two kinds of
rape: 1) aggravated-cases where there was extrinsic violence,
more than one assailant, or where the victim and defendant
were complete strangers; and 2) simple-all other cases.'47 In
comparing verdicts on the same cases rendered by a jury and
a judge, they came up with some "startling" results: "The jury
convicts of rape in just three out of forty-two cases of simple
rape; further, the percentage of disagreement with the judge on
the major charge is virtually one hundred percent (201/2 out of
22). The figures could not be more emphatic."'48 Thus, the jury
frequently acquits defendants where a theoretically more neu-
tral judge4 ' would convict.
As the reality of the law in practice becomes clear, the
weaknesses in the chain of reasoning supporting the special
rape procedures begin to emerge. In fact no link in the chain
seems to find support in actual practice. Rape is not easy to
charge and frequently is easy to disprove. The number of false
rape charges compares favorably with the false charges of other
crimes. The jury far from being sympathetic with the victim,
more often is an ally of the defendant. Despite the inherent
weaknesses in the chain of reasoning supporting them, the spe-
cial rape procedures continue to be utilized. These procedures,
including the psychiatric examination, add to the ordeal that
attends the crime itself. It is important then, to understand
how the whole system functions from the victim's point of view.
THE VICTIM'S INTERACTION WITH THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
Though it may be now considered trite to say this, it is still
true that the whole criminal justice process rapes the victim all
over again.5 0 It is certainly not a novel point of view. 5' As
quoted in one article: 'Rape is the only crime in which the
victim is doubly violated, first by the attacker, and then by
147. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 140, at 252.
148. Id. at 253-54.
149. But see Bohmer, supra note 144.
150. Bay Area Women Against Rape (BAWAR), a rape crisis center in Berkeley,
Cal. has compiled some statistical data about rape and the victim's interaction with
the criminal justice process. See Hands Off!, BAWAR Newsletter, March, 1977, at 13-
16. This data was compiled by the author of this article and appears in app. A, infra.
BAWAR is "[Olne of the earliest and most successful rape crisis centers," N. GAGER
& C. SCHURR, supra note 43, at 264, and deals with well over 300 rape victims per year.
151. See Weis & Borges, supra note 37, at 103. See also Berger, Man's Trial,
Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1977).
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society.' "15 The victim must first face the indignities of her
treatment by the police, then the hospital, and perhaps worst
of all, the court system. 53 Even the California Supreme Court
acknowledged that "the initial emotional trauma of submitting
to official investigatory processes" may be one of the reasons
victims choose not to report rape.'54 Police treatment of rape
victims is variable,'55 depending on many different factors in
the rape, the victim, the individual officers, etc. A significant
proportion of rape victims report a negative reaction to their
treatment by the police, 5 ' which many rape crisis centers at-
tribute as a cause of victim nonreporting.'57 In fact, victims
frequently report that their encounters with police, district at-
torneys and courtroom personnel were more traumatic than
the rape incident itself.5 8 At the hospital, the rape victim tends
to be treated as a piece of evidence rather than as a person. '
"[Flor the woman coming in [to the hospital] it really is
almost like a second rape. She has been in a situation [rape]
where she has been powerless and been given orders and made
to do things. She walks into the hospital and the same thing
happens again."'' 0
For the victim, the experience with the court and its ac-
couterments often emerges as the greatest ordeal. Again, she
is often regarded as simply a piece of evidence.'' Victims may
refuse to prosecute in order to "avoid having to relive a trau-
matic and humiliating experience for the benefit of the judge
and jury."'62 The California Supreme Court has also observed
that the embarrassment of a trial is one of the primary reasons
152. Comment, supra note 53, at 37.
153. Note, supra note 39, at 1552.
154. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 880, 558 P.2d 247, 258, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 130 (1975).
155. A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: VICTIMS OF CRISIS 73 (1974).
156. PRELIMINARY RAPE STUDY, supra note 119, at 20 (41% of victims interviewed
found the police to be callous, unbelieving or indifferent); APPROACH ASSOCIATES, SEX-
UAL ASSAULT: THE POLICE RESPONSE 37 (1976) (a training manual prepared for the Palo
Alto Police Dept.) (a study of Palo Alto victims found that a third of them showed
strongly negative attitudes about their experience with police). See also app. A infra.
157. Reisner, supra note 49, at 71-72.
158. Bohmer, supra note 144, at 303.
159. 1975 Hearings, supra note 58, at 156 (remarks of Roberta O'Neale); accord,
Note, supra note 39, at 1553 n.10.
160. 1975 Hearings, supra note 58, at 158.
161. Bohmer, supra note 144, at 303.
162. Note, supra note 10, at 1375.
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why the victim does not report the crime.' 3 A large part of the
trauma of going to court is the feeling that the victim herself
is on trial.' 4 In most cases the court seems to place the woman
in the position of having to prove herself innocent. 5 This at-
mosphere of disbelief and lack of support, as exemplified by,
among other things, the practice of some agencies in using lie
detector tests, contributes to the victim's fear of testifying, and
ultimately to her decision not to prosecute.' 6 According to the
authors of one article, "the extent of the trauma suffered by the
victim in her contact with the legal system is in large measure
due to the attitudes and consequent treatment of the victim by
the law enforcement and court personnel with whom she
deals."' 67
To have to go through all that a rape victim goes through
and then to have to undergo a psychiatric examination as well,
seems "a bit much," as one district attorney commented.' 68
This sort of examination provides one more invasion into the
victim's emotional integrity. It is also an additional attack on
the victim's credibility. Something like the examination might
be just what it would take to tip the balance and cause the
victim to decide not to go through with the prosecution. In view
of this hazard, the need for the examination must be carefully
weighed against the advantages of banning it entirely.
THE PROBLEMS OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
The psychiatric examination of sex offense victims raises
a number of problems to the point where banning them entirely
can seriously be considered.
An initial problem raised by the examination is its actual
value to the judicial process even when conducted by an expert.
The thrust of the examination is to determine whether the
victim is capable of telling the truth, yet it has been said that
"[a] good poker player probably knows better than a psychia-
trist whether a person is lying."'' 0 Psychiatrists are not lie det-
163. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 880, 538 P.2d 247, 258, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 130 (1975).
164. A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 155, at 201.
165. Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the Court,
58 JUDICATURE 391, 398 (1975).
166. Reisner, supra note 49, at 35, 76-77.
167. Bohmer & Blumberg, supra note 165, at 398-99.
168. Interview with Howard Janssen, Deputy District Attorney of Alameda
County, in Oakland, Cal. (Sept. 20, 1976).
169. Slovenko, supra note 11, at 21.
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ectors, as even the most ardent supporters of psychiatric exam-
inations will admit. In fact, "[tlhere is no question that psy-
chiatric judgments are far less reliable and valid than poly-
graph judgments.""'7 Where false testimony has its basis in
something other than psychopathology, a psychiatric examina-
tion will be of no use.' The value of the examination is further
weakened by the circumstances under which it is conducted.
Slovenko makes a cogent argument that there are a number of
factors in the legal setting which make it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to obtain a reliable psychiatric evaluation. He says that
"[a] psychiatric evaluation usually rests on the complete trust
between the patient and psychiatrist."'72 However, he notes
that in a courtroom setting a witness may feel attacked, bring-
ing defense mechanisms into play, which will shut out or dis-
tort pertinent psychiatric material.'
However, proponents of the examination generally make
no claim for lie detection. They only credit the psychiatrist
with the ability to observe a person and perceive mental illness
that would affect the ability to tell the truth. As pointed out
by the authors of an article on psychiatrists as expert witnesses,
"the usefulness of psychiatric evidence . . . is measured by the
probability that what he has to say offers more information and
better comprehension of the human behavior which the law
wants to understand."' 74 Despite the claims of the proponents,
it has been strongly argued that psychiatric judgments are no
more reliable or valid than those made by laymen, and that
such judgments are not so very different from those that lay-
men are accustomed to making.' 5 In fact, there are those who
argue that psychiatric judgments are neither reliable, nor valid
in diagnosing even mental illness.'76 The California Supreme
Court itself, observed: "It must be conceded that psychiatrists
still experience considerable difficulty in confidently and ac-
curately diagnosing mental illness."'77 Similarly, one study
170. Ennis & Litwak, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 736 (1974).
171. 26 IND. L.J. 98, 102 n.17 (1950).
172. Slovenko, supra note 11, at 20.
173. Id. at 15.
174. Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Rumina-
tions and Speculation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1335, 1342 (1965).
175. Ennis & Litwak, supra note 170, at 707, 710, 742.
176. Id. at 699-711.
177. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 326, 535 P.2d 352, 365, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488,
501 (1975) (emphasis in original).
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seems to indicate that they are also unable to detect sanity.'"
Ennis and Litwak go even farther: "It is important to under-
stand that psychiatric judgments are not only unreliable with
respect to the ultimate diagnoses, but lack consistency even in
the perception of the presence, nature, and severity of symp-
toms." 79
Even if one concedes that psychiatric examinations have
some value in the court process, they raise an additional prob-
lem; i.e., how many interviews are necessary to enable a psy-
chiatrist to come to a valid conclusion about a witness'
credibility? One commentator who favors the examinations
notes that the determination of credibility is an exceedingly
complex task.' In this author's opinion no single conventional
psychiatric interview is a sufficient basis for any diagnosis of
credibility; that an intensive history is necessary; and that the
usual one to two hour psychiatric interview is insufficient.'"' It
also must be established that the techniques and/or theories on
which the expert bases his opinions are generally accepted in
the field.' 2
The problem is that the actual practice in the courts
rarely, if ever, meets these ideal requirements. Diamond and
Louisell pin-pointed this difficulty with forensic psychiatry
when they said: "The psychiatric expert is apt not to be a very
wise man, but rather a possessor of technical knowledge of
some depth, but little breadth. He seldom comprehends or is
sympathetic to the legal process.' 83
Another problem raised by the examination is that courts
assume that psychiatrists provide "neutral expertise rather
than professional viewpoint."'' s In reality, this assumption of
impartiality is open to question.' 5 According to Ennis and Lit-
wak, "the so called 'independent' psychiatrist, despite claims
to the contrary does not exist. Furthermore, the judgments of
even 'independent' psychiatrists are subject to bias and
error. ' ' 's The misuse of this expertise is evidenced by some of
178. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 378, 384-
85 (1973).
179. Ennis & Litwak, supra note 170, at 706.
180. Tuchler, supra note 9, at 327.
181. Id. at 328, 336. See also Ennis & Litwak, supra note 170, at 724.
182. Juviler, supra note 9, at 658.
183. Diamond & Louisell, supra note 174, at 1342.
184. Id. at 1344 (emphasis deleted).
185. Id. Unfortunately, psychiatrists as well as the courts make this assumption
of impartiality. See J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 58 (1969).
186. Ennis & Litwak, supra note 170, at 746. For an in depth discussion of this
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the practices approved by courts. In one case a court approved
sending victims hundreds of miles away for an interview with
a defense psychiatrist."' Another implied a twenty minute in-
terview was sufficient to establish a witness' credibility. 8 The
inference to be gained from yet another case was that merely
seeing a psychiatrist was relevant evidence on credibility.,"
In view of the problems raised by the psychiatric examina-
tions and the judgments based on them, it is not surprising that
they have many critics. The Oregon Supreme Court makes one
compelling argument against court ordered psychiatric exami-
nations: "[I]f a witness was willing to submit to such exami-
nation no necessity for a court order would exist, and . . . the
results of a psychiatric examination of a witness unwilling to
volunteer for such an examination would be questionable at
best."' 190 This view is echoed by a commentator discussing the
psychiatric examination of the defendant in a sexual offense
case: "Moreover, if the defendant is compelled to talk, the
information gained is of little value. From a medical point of
view, any psychiatric evaluation made under threat of con-
tempt is invalid. "I"' There is another strong argument made by
the opponents of the psychiatric examination. Assuming a psy-
chiatrist can tell if a person is subject to delusions, the fact that
this person is subject to delusions does not prove that she is not
the victim of a sex crime.'92
In a similar vein, opponents of the psychiatric examina-
tions reason that they can lead to a battle of the experts which
thoroughly dissects the victim's psyche in the courtroom.'93
Chief Judge Bazelon lists some of the dangers the examination
can pose for the peace of mind of the victim:
[A] psychiatric examination may seriously impinge on a
witness' right to privacy; the trauma that attends the role
of complainant to sex offense charges is sharply increased
particular problem, see Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCH. CRIM.
PSYCHODYNAMICS 221 (1959).
187. See People v. Davis, 20 Cal. App. 3d 890, 98 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1971).
188. See People v. Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 443 P.2d 794, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968).
189. See People v. Newton, 244 Cal. App. 2d 82, 88, 52 Cal. Rptr. 727, 732 (1966).
190. State v. Walgrave, 243 Or. 328, 412 P.2d 23 (1966) (rape, adult female
victim/witness).
191. Comment, Sexual Psychopathy-A Legal Labyrinth of Medicine, 36 NEv.
L. REV. 320, 336 (1957) (emphasis added).
192. Note, supra note 11, at 1143.
193. Id. at 1142. As this commentator noted: "Some might find rape itself hardly
more traumatic." Id.
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by the indignity of a psychiatric examination; the exami-
nation could itself serve as a tool of harassment; and the
impact of all these considerations may well deter the vic-
tim of such a crime from lodging any complaint at all. 94
There are so many possible dangers, it is hard to do more
than just list them, rather than discuss them at length. The
court in Ballard in fact does just that in a footnote:
A psychiatrist's testimony on the credibility of a witness
may involve many dangers: The psychiatrist's testimony
may not be relevant; the techniques used and theories ad-
vanced may not be generally accepted; the psychiatrist
may not be in any better position to evaluate credibility
than the juror; difficulties may arise in communication
between the psychiatrist and the jury; too much reliance
may be placed upon the testimony of the psychiatrist; par-
tisan psychiatrists may cloud rather than clarify issues;
the testimony may be distracting, time-consuming and
costly.195
Considering the list, it is almost surprising that the court still
decided to mandate the court ordered examinations.
One final, very real danger is something that happens all
too often in rape cases-the distraction of the jury's attention
from the defendant to the mental state of the victim/witness. 196
Psychiatric testimony exacerbates an already severe problem
of focusing on the victim to the exclusion of the perpetrator-it
becomes a real question of who's on trial. The jurors often get
confused. Along similar lines, there is the possibility for abuse
by the defense, of using the pretext of examining credibility to
suggest to the jury that the victim is "crazy" or a "kook" and
thus deserved what she got.'97
It should be abundantly clear that the court ordered psy-
chiatric examination is subject to a host of problems. The ques-
tion is what to do about it.
194. United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rape, mentally
retarded 18 year old victim/witness).
195. 64 Cal. 2d at 175 n.10, 410 P.2d at 848 n.10, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 312 n.10.
196. Comment, Psychiatric Examinations of Witnesses: Standards, Timing and
Use by Indigents, 55 IowA L. REV. 1286, 1293 (1970).
197. It should be noted that such defense maneuvers are facilitated by the fact
that many women today have had some psychiatric care. In a Philadelphia study, over
25% of the rape victims had received some sort of psychiatric assistance prior to the
rape incident, even though over 70% of the victims reported an income of less than
$9000 per year. See Peters, Meyer & Carrol, The Philadelphia Assault Victim Study
118, table 112 (June 30, 1976), cited in Bienen, supra note 75.
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CONCLUSION
Presently, at the trial level, motions requesting court or-
dered psychiatric examinations are made fairly often, but only
infrequently granted.' It has been suggested that judges avoid
granting them because it puts them out on a limb for the defen-
dant or because of raised consciousness on the issue of rape."'
In general, district attorneys also dislike the rule, largely be-
cause of its effect on the victim.10° However, due to the radical
changes in the California rape laws,2"' the Ballard examination
is one of the few special weapons left in the defense arsenal.
Therefore, it is likely that the future will show an increase in
the use of, or at least requests for, this examination.
198. In Alameda County, in 1976, approximately 12 Ballard motions were made,
of which 2 to 3 were granted. Interview with Alice Sullivan, Deputy District Attorney
(Calendar Deputy) of Alameda County, in Oakland, Cal. (Mar. 3, 1977). In Contra
Costa County, in 1976, about 7 to 9 motions were put forward, of which 3 or 4 went to
hearing, and of those 2 were granted. Interview with Dale Miller, Deputy District
Attorney (former Calendar Deputy) of Contra Costa County, in Martinez, Cal. (Mar.
7, 1977). Somewhat more extensive data was available for San Diego County concern-
ing Ballard motions:*
Year Motions Made Motions Granted
1975 18 4
1976 24 4
1977** 7 2
*This data represents approximately 60% of the motions made,
however the ratio of motions granted remains approximately
the same for the remaining 40% for which data was un-
available.
**January and February only.
Letter from Peter C. Lehman, Deputy District Attorney
(Chief Appellate Division) of San Diego County, to author
(March 1977).
In San'Francisco County, where about 150 rape cases are filed by the District
Attorney's office each year, approximately 12 to 15 Ballard motions were made in 1976,
of which 1 or 2 were granted. Telephone interviews with Robert Dondero, Deputy
District Attorney (head of the Sex Crimes Prosecution Team) of San Francisco County
(June 8, 1977), and Maxine Mackler, Deputy District Attorney (former head of the Sex
Crimes Prosecution Team) of San Francisco County (May 31, 1977). Mr. Dondero
commented that the defense rarely made an adequate showing of justification.
199. Interview with Howard Janssen, Deputy District Attorney of Alameda
County, in Oakland, Cal. (Sept. 20, 1976); Interview with Dick Eigelhart, Deputy
District Attorney of Alameda County, in Oakland, Cal. (Sept. 3, 1976); Interview with
Roger Hughes, Deputy District Attorney of Contra Costa County, in Richmond, Cal.
(Aug. 30, 1976).
200. Id.
201. See notes 55-68 and accompanying text supra.
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It can be argued, however, that the changes in the law
should mandate a reconsideration of Ballard. It is reasonable
to assume that the changes in the evidence code and jury in-
structions show a legislative intent to treat rape victims just
like any other victim of crime and to try to encourage their
cooperation with the criminal justice system.
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court evinced a sim-
ilar intent, when, in striking down the former cautionary in-
struction, they asserted that Hale's views were outdated in the
light of the panoply of rights now afforded the criminal defen-
-dant.02
Clearly, the examination procedures are unacceptable in
their present form as defined by Ballard-Russell. Currently,
the trial judge has wide discretion to order the prosecutrix to
undergo a psychiatric examination on the question of her credi-
bility, when he/she feels there is an emotional condition in-
volved related to credibility, which laymen could not detect. 03
Also, this discretion is to be exercised liberally in favor of the
defendant."0 ' One reform option is to eliminate the examination
entirely given the questionable value of psychiatric diagnosis
to the sex offense case.2 5 This is perhaps an unrealistic expec-
tation of the criminal justice system at this time, since the
belief is strongly entrenched that witness' may possess mental
or emotional conditions which affect credibility which are be-
yond the comprehension of laymen.2 16
If the examination is to be retained, there is a need to
extend its use to all crimes and all witnesses, eliminating its
position as a special rape rule. As one commentator noted:
"The goal of reform in the use of evidence of the character and
reputation of the prosecutrix in a rape case should be to abolish
the distinction between rape victims and victims of other
crimes."2' 7 This excellent sentiment is equally applicable to the
use of court ordered psychiatric examinations in sex offense
cases.
If the examination is to be retained, there is also a need
for some strong qualifications. First, there should be a severe
restriction on the discretion of the trial judge, and that discre-
202. See notes 119-137 and accompanying text supra.
203. See notes 20-30 and accompanying text supra.
204. Id.
205. See notes 169-196 and accompanying text supra.
206. See notes 20-30 and accompanying text supra.
207. Comment, supra note 53, at 51.
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tion should not be liberally exercised in favor of the defense.
This would check the proliferation of the motion, minimizing
the adverse effects on victims. 08 Second, the psychiatrist
should always be court appointed and never chosen, or sug-
gested, by the parties. While true impartiality may be an un-
reachable goal, at least the court can make an effort to reduce
the level of bias involved. Nor should the court allow court
appointment to mask behind-the-scenes manipulations by the
parties. Third, safeguards should be set up to insure that the
victim interview is in sufficient depth so as to provide a compe-
tent psychiatric judgment. This will enhance the reliability of
any opinion offered as a result of the examination. Fourth,
procedures should be established to provide well-qualified
appointed psychiatrists with expertise on and experience with
victims. This suggestion could be implemented by having a
panel of specially trained psychiatrists (approved by a women's
group or crisis center in the case of rape victims) that the judge
could choose from. This would serve the dual function of fur-
ther enhancing the validity of the examination and easing the
impact of the examination of the victim. Finally, and most
importantly, if the examination is to be retained, studies
should be instituted to ascertain more accurately the useful-
ness to, and the effect on, the legal system of such psychiatric
testimony, and whether such testimony has any validity.
208. See notes 193-194 and accompanying text supra.
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Appendix A
1. Type of assault reported:
Forced
Attempted Oral
Year Rape Rape Copulation
1975
(N= 221) 88% 12%
1976
(N= 251) 85% 13%
2. Relationship of attacker to victim:
Year Known* Unknown
1975
(N= 189) 43% 57%
1976
(N = 213) 33% 67%
*"Known" includes anyone from relative, cl
ual, brief acquaintance.
3. Location of the rape":
Victim's Rapist's
ose friend, to cas-
Year Home Home Outside Car Other
1975
(N = 170) 42% 9% 25% 12% 12%
1976
(N = 198) 45% 15% 14% 15% 12%
*This is the place of the actual occurrence of the rape, and
may or may not be the location of the first contact between
the victim and her attacker.
Method of attack used:
Year Force" Weapon"" Trick
1975
(N = 154) 57% 40% 3%
1976
(N = 172) 52% 44% 4%
"Force" means physical force was used and no weapon was
involved.
."Weapon" means a weapon such as a gun or knife was
used; force may or may not have also been used.
4.
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5. Victim resistance to the attack, correlated with victim in-
jury:
Injured* Not Injured
Resist- Didn't Resist- Didn't
Year ed*: Resist ed Resist
1975
(N = 99) 42% 12% 10% 35%*":
1976
(N = 89) 36% 6% 8% 51%
*"Injured" includes all injuries, minor or major, beyond
very minor scratches or bruises.
**"Resisted" includes any physical resistance; but does not
include arguing, screaming, or running away.
***May not add up to 100% due to rounding off.
6. Reporting of rape to the criminal justice system:
Year Reported* Didn't Report
1975
(N= 190) 68% 32%
1976
(N = 218) 67% 33%
*Does not include anonymous reports to the police by third
parties.
7. Treatment of the reporting victim by the criminal justice
system*:
Police Hospital/Doctor
Year Good Fair Bad Year Good Fair Bad
1975 1975
(N=-77) 61% 12% 27% (N=65) 60% 17% 23%
1976 1976
(N =92) 40% 25% 35% (N=59) 53% 27% 20%
*Data on victims' treatment by the courts and their personnel
was insufficient to draw any significant conclusions from, but
appeared as mixed as that for the police and the hospital. (Most
victims have contact with a rape crisis center before they go
into the court system).
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